On 30 May 2001, a European Parliamentary committee recommended that all businesses, institutions and government offices 'systematically' protect themselves against the world’s largest covert spy network, the Echelon. Not only have organisations been recommended to guard against economic espionage, but last year France set a precedent for the protection of individual privacy by authorising the use of encryption in private messages.
Unfortunately for us, the ALP and the government colluded to dissolve our rights to privacy, from either the Echelon or other 'data-mining' (collecting) systems. Now our most highly confidential and personal details will be available in the open market. In fact the government actively assisted in removing blocks to such invasions of privacy.
Thanks to the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill tabled in the House of Representatives on 26 June 2000, Australian citizens, residents and businesses can look forward to unforeseen forms of privacy invasion.
Ignoring advice from privacy advocates, those in charge of the Bill consultation process excluded any formal mechanism for bringing corporations or government bodies to account.
IT specialist Roger Clarke, of Xamax Consultancy in Canberra, stated in his submission on the draft Bill to the Attorney-General, that it was 'as though the government's intent were to create an image of a protective regime, while actually reducing privacy protections, and legitimising privacy-abusive practices'. Clarke concluded that the additions this Bill did include for protecting privacy would have little effect.
This is a non-partisan issue. The ALP assisted the government by guaranteeing a quiet passage of the Bill by avoiding a Senate inquiry. Given the backlash against Bob Hawke's infamous Australia Card, an inquiry would have drawn a lot of public attention to a Bill that effectively protects the interests of big business and sells out on the privacy interests of the public.
Due to take effect later this year, this Bill will allow data-mining companies legal authority to gain information, Clarke says. This includes the right to collect information on any group, business, community or individual.
Former spy Mike Frost, with thirty-four years' experience of procedures in the Canadian government, states that personal information includes name, address, telephone number, age, family status, sex, sexual preference, occupation, medical, health, dental and travel records, assets, liabilities, income and payment records, credit-card information and history, bank records, criminal records -- and more. He says the Canadian government was denying the existence of such information as he was feeding it into the database.
Frost explains further. When speaking out against New Zealand's current draconian legislation that will allow their Security Intelligence Service to intercept and censor private emails, Frost said:
The Canadian government has a database that contains personal information concerning its citizens. It is my opinion that the government of New Zealand probably has a similar database. I mean, why wouldn’t they?
It is naïve to assume that Australians are somehow immune. Given that global sources, combined with sophisticated compiling procedures, allow comprehensive profiles on any individual to be purchased in this booming market, we should take heed of what is occurring in Australia. Unhindered by public scrutiny, many data-mining companies are becoming unscrupulous in their behaviour.
Mervyn Vogt, union delegate, Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Officer and candidate for the board of Telstra, works in their specialist-products department, assisting customers having difficulty with their Telstra products. Taking an average of a hundred calls a day from around the world, Vogt works with the uncomfortable knowledge that, even if a client consents to having a conversation recorded, this does not necessarily protect their rights to privacy.
Neither representing Telstra nor speaking as an employee, Vogt says:
People who ring up all call centres have faith in the people they are talking to, but not necessarily with the organisations they’re dealing with.
Conversations often include private and personal details. It is not uncommon for a person to ring up in a desperate state -- like a wife who tries to use her mobile phone to seek help from a violent husband; or a teenager who fears that she is being stalked. In moments of stress you can reveal more about yourself than intended, and it's this type of information that is a goldmine for data-mining agencies.
There is little protection from privacy abuse. Vogt says:
Phone companies are not subject to the Privacy Act. It is only subject to the Telecommunications Interception Act, which means that, if I were involved in a crime, the police would be required to get a court order to tap my phone. Phone companies have unfettered access to all personal customer information it records.
As OHS officer, Vogt has sought from Telstra their official legal position regarding these activities and has been refused on many occasions. 'No company by law can require an employee to participate in an act that even has the remotest possibility of being illegal,' concludes Vogt.
Vogt is not told what happens to this data, and as Telstra seems unanswerable to anyone, it is impossible to verify what happens to this information. Anne O’Rourke, from Liberty Victoria, says: 'The current ad-hoc regulatory approach does not adequately protect citizens' personal data from the dangers of misuse.'
There are many ways to collect personal data. Workplace relations provides ample opportunity for possible abuse, and Telstra may also be involved.
The Cameo program, which, Vogt says, 30 per cent of US corporations use, sifts through 5,000 messages an hour looking for key words. If a message is found containing any of these words, the message and its attachments are forwarded to the employee’s supervisor who reads them in full.
Since Fairfax first published these allegations in April 2001, Telstra management required Vogt to attend a series of meetings. Telstra had assumed that Vogt had spoken on behalf of the company. Since Vogt had not, Telstra did not pursue this, but they did add that Telstra had no dispute with the above claims, nor were they going to pursue this.
Instead of trying to intimidate Vogt into silence, one would assume that Telstra would legally pursue Fairfax.
'In my view', says Pat Woods, Industrial Officer for the Communications Workers Union, 'our society is all the more poorer when honest people like Vogt are silenced by unaccountable monoliths like Telstra'.
Not only individuals are vulnerable. Governments too could fall on their own sword. Some government institutions such as the Australian Defence Force (ADF) seem to be contracting out critical services to private interests. Take, for example, the ADF's contract with Optus to run its spy satellite (AAP, 5 April 2001). But Optus is likely to be sold to a Singapore government-owned company. Half of the $A500 million satellite concerned carries highly confidential Australian military data, while the other half is for civilian commercial communications. It defies belief that Australian interests could be protected if our surveillance systems are controlled by foreign powers.
More worrisome is the Australia-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) currently under negotiation. By relinquishing control of its spy satellite, and Singapore gaining access to privileged information, Australia may irretrievably compromise its negotiating position.
There's no happy ending here. Thanks to the ALP it will be business as usual after the federal election.
Alan Griffiths is a freelance journalist and a member of WTO Watch
